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Resumo: Este estudo apresenta uma análise crítica de como o ensino e a gestão 
vem sendo rearticulada pelas políticas neoliberais e pelas práticas da nova gestão 
política. Analisa essas mudanças nos setores sociais e compara com políticas 
internacionais. Essas novas organizações flexíveis fazem parte de um crescente 
modelo de negócios neoliberal que alguns teóricos sociais atribuem uma 
inautenticidade crescente nas organizações (Sennett, 1998), desenvolvem maior 
flexibilidade para responder aos mercados e não para satisfazer as necessidades 
humanas daqueles que trabalham neles. O estudo concluiu que o modelo 
concorrencial de gestão escolar não está mudando apenas o que os profissionais 
fazem, mas sim quem eles são. A concorrência está reconstruindo suas próprias 
identidades, tanto pessoais como profissionais.
_____________________________________________________________
Palavras‑chave: Políticas Públicas Educacionais; Nova Gestão Pública; 
meritocracia
Abstract: This study presents a critical analysis of  how education and management 
have been re-articulated by neoliberal policies and practices of  new political 
management. It analyzes these changes in the social sectors and compares 
them with international policies. These new flexible organizations are part of  a 
growing model of  neoliberal business to which some social theorists attribute a 
growing inauthenticity in organizations (Sennett, 1998), and a development of  
greater flexibility to respond to the markets and not to satisfy the human needs 
of  those who work in these markets. The study concluded that the competitive 
model of  school management is not only changing what professionals do but 
who they are. Competition is rebuilding their own identities, both personal and 
professional.
_____________________________________________________________
Keywords: public educational policies; New Public Management; meritocracy.
Resumen: Este estudio presenta un análisis crítico de cómo la enseñanza y la 
gestión están siendo (re)articuladas por las políticas neoliberales y por las prácticas 
de la nueva gestión política. Analiza esos cambios en los sectores sociales y 
compara con políticas internacionales. Esas nuevas organizaciones flexibles 
forman parte de un creciente modelo de negocios neoliberales que algunos 
teóricos sociales atribuyen una inautenticidad creciente en las organizaciones 
(Sennett, 1998), desarrollan mayor flexibilidad para responder a los mercados 
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y no para satisfacer las necesidades humanas de aquellos que trabajan en ellos. 
El estudio concluyó que el modelo de la concurrencia de gestión escolar no 
está cambiando solo lo que hacen los profesionales, sino quienes son ellos. La 
concurrencia está reconstruyendo sus propias identidades, tanto personales 
como profesionales.
_____________________________________________________________
Palabras clave: Políticas Públicas Educativas; Nueva Gestión Pública; 
meritocracia.
INTRODUCTION
 In 2008, the New York City Department of  Education mandated that 
every school have an inquiry group (Robinson, 2010). In theory, anyone who 
believes that teachers should engage in collaborative inquiry and be provided with 
lots of  student data should support this policy, although some might object to its 
being mandated. However, when the focus is almost exclusively on testing data 
or other quantitative outcomes, such policies can have problematic outcomes. 
An account by a teacher in New York City is typical of  anecdotes widely shared 
by teachers who are frustrated at how tightly scaffolded (Talbert, 2012) and 
protocoled (McDonald, 2007) these inquiry groups tend to be. In too many cases, 
while claiming to empower teachers and principals with data, they are actually 
deprofessionalizing them. 
 The teacher reported that the inquiry group in her school observed that 
their most pressing problem was that an alarming number of  their students were 
dropping out between ninth and tenth grade. They decided to select fifteen ninth 
graders and do interviews and focus groups with them. Their goal was to better 
understand the issues they were facing and to see if  some of  them might be school 
or classroom-related and therefore amenable to intervention by the school. 
 When the data coach from the central office attended their next inquiry 
group meeting, they were told that they did not seem to understand how the 
inquiry group was supposed to work. They were to use testing data to identify 
deficits in their students’ achievement and to provide remediation. This meant 
using spreadsheets of  student test scores to identify which skills needed re-
teaching. The teachers felt that their own approach to school inquiry was not 
valued and began to feel that the inquiry groups were not meant to be about 
authentic inquiry at all.  Rather, they suspected that they were put in place, at 
least in part, as a way to get teachers to use the quantitative data that the district 
was generating through their contracts with data gathering, warehousing, and 
management firms. They felt that these “inquiry groups” were in fact, more about 
data — and a certain type of  data — than any kind of  authentic inquiry. 
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 A typical data-driven approach was that of  SAM (Scaffolded 
Apprenticeship Model) which “engages a team of  teachers in systematically using 
evidence of  struggling students’ skill gaps to both design instructional responses 
and re-design systems that inhibit their skill development” (Talbert, 2012, p. 5). 
Of  course, “skill gaps” in too many cases, refer to spreadsheets of  test data; not 
teacher generated formative assessments. 
 Some have argued that this attention to individual student data encourages 
a meritocratic view of  schooling and undercuts a more complex understanding 
of  socio-cultural, socio-emotional, and out-of-school factors that impact children 
(Berliner, 2009).  On a more pragmatic level, teachers complain that there is 
too much lag time between the test and when they get the data. Furthermore, 
it reduces teaching and learning to a process of  test-remediate, test-remediate, 
test-remediate which impoverishes teaching and provides little professional 
development or judgment for teachers.
 In fairness, some forethought and structure do need to be in place for 
a successful collaborative inquiry to occur in schools. Moreover, some principals 
were able to use the mandated spaces the inquiry groups provided to promote and 
support authentic inquiry, and many data coaches had a more expansive notion of  
inquiry and teaching. Nevertheless, the issue from the district’s perspective was 
one of  getting a “buy-in” from teachers to use the 80-million-dollar Achievement 
Reporting and Innovation System (ARIS) database that the New York City 
Department of  education had purchased (and is now defunct) (Phillips, 2015). 
While the new district superintendent brings a somewhat different philosophy 
regarding the use of  data, the damage to the teaching profession and the creation 
of  a narrow culture of  data utilization will be hard to reverse.  
 There are many more examples of  how teachers and principals feel that 
they are not involved in decisions that affect their professional lives and how 
their professional judgment is disrespected and their work degraded in a growing 
“audit” culture. At the end of  this article, I will provide an example of  what 
collaborative teacher inquiry can look like when teachers are involved in decision-
making and their professional judgment drives the inquiry.
 Meanwhile, there is a growing body of  research that documents a major 
shift in what it means to be a professional (Evetts, 2011; Fenwick, 2016). This 
shift is occurring in both the private and public sector. Because public education 
is influenced by trends within the private sector, we will discuss how private sector 
workers are experiencing the neoliberal workplace. Then we will discuss how this 
is affecting public sector professionals, specifically teachers and administrators. 
We will also discuss in some detail how shifts in the political economy and the 
policy context have led to a tendency toward deprofessionalization.
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THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTExT FOR THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF A “NEW” PROFESSIONAL
 In this article, I will engage in a critical analysis of  the ways teaching 
and leading are being reengineered by Neoliberal policies and the New Public 
Management practices. In order to critically analyze these changes in policy and 
practice, I will work across social sectors (education, business, public health, 
criminal justice, etc.) and compare policies internationally.
 Unfortunately, most scholarship in education are produced within narrow 
disciplinary and sectorial “silos” and are country specific in their research focus, 
even though school reform is now a global phenomenon. And this is not only 
true in the field of  education. Researchers across fields are so specialized that they 
cannot possibly understand the proverbial elephant, but only the trunk, a leg, or 
the tail. And yet, what is happening to educators today is also happening to nurses, 
social workers, doctors and police officers. And these changes are occurring on 
every continent. 
 A “new professionalism” (Evetts, 2009; 2011) is being constructed in 
all professions and in all countries. While it is enacted differently depending on 
local contexts, the struggles and dilemmas of  the British, Chilean, Australian, and 
U.S. teachers, principals, and professors are strikingly similar, as are the neoliberal 
policies these countries have implemented since the 1980s. A few countries 
have taken a different route. Finland is probably the best known. In there, the 
government invests heavily in education, teachers are still highly professionalized, 
and they see teaching as a long-term career and their professional judgment is 
respected (Adamson, Astrand and Darling-Hammond, 2016; Salhberg, 2015). In 
Finland, there are no standardized tests, charter schools, vouchers, or any other 
market policies that some countries use instead of  following a public investment 
strategy. And yet, Finland scores among the very top nations in the world in 
educational achievement.
 Returning to Max Webber’s classic distinction between instrumental 
and substantive rationality might help us frame this neoliberal shift, at least at 
the organizational level. Much new policy language contrasts “old” bureaucracy 
with new entrepreneurial approaches that claim to have flattened hierarchies and 
de-bureaucratized organizations. Many still tend to blame public bureaucracies 
for problems in education, and the critique of  bureaucracy is embedded today 
in coded language like “educrats.” Max Webber focused heavily on the threat 
that the instrumental rationality of  bureaucracies represented for society. In such 
organizations, people tend to be means to ends, rather than ends in themselves, 
he argued. Human relations theories tend to call for treating people well and 
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including them in decisions, not so much because this is the way people should be 
treated, but rather, because “empowered” employees tend to be more productive. 
 Webber sought more substantive forms of  rationality in which people 
were ends in themselves and in which social ends took precedent over individual 
goals. Newer “network” organizations have changed in form, but as we will see, 
they continue to operate on the basis of  instrumental rationality, a tendency 
exacerbated in public organizations as they increasingly operate in a marketized 
environment.
 While new business models attempt to manage through network 
organization, rather than through bureaucratic hierarchies, there is some evidence 
that this has intensified instrumental rationality, not reduced it. These new flexible 
organizations are part of  a growing neoliberal business model to which some 
social theorists attribute a growing inauthenticity in organizations (Sennett, 1998). 
They have developed greater flexibility to respond to markets, not to meet the 
human needs of  those who work in them.
 As market relations become dominant in all aspects of  our lives, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to think beyond individual competition towards 
any sense of  a common good. While most people think of  neoliberalism as a 
purely economic model, it has important social and cultural consequences that we 
are only beginning to understand. Richard Sennett (2006) provides perhaps the 
most eloquent account of  the ways that shifts in political economy have resulted 
in cultural shifts in our workplaces and in the ways we live our lives. Since the 
corporate workplace is increasingly the model for schools, Sennett’s work has 
important implications for 21st century school leaders. In his qualitative study 
of  several corporations, Sennett has identified characteristics of  work in what he 
calls the new capitalism. I will provide a condensed version of  his argument here. 
 Sennett (2006) traces the recent phenomenon of  globalization back to 
the breakdown in 1973 of  the Bretton Woods controls over the global circulation 
of  money. After Bretton Woods, there were large amounts of  new capital 
seeking short-term investments. Later, stock prices began to replace profit as a 
goal for many businesses. Money was made, not by owning and producing, but 
by trading, and later speculation. This new speculative and flexible approach to 
capital has changed work life and institutional structures, particularly in sectors 
of  capitalism such as finance, insurance, real estate, media, communications and 
high technology, where short-term exchange replaces long-term relationships. To 
fit into this new “fast” capitalism, workers have to give up notions of  stability of  
employment and become flexible, mobile, workers in a constantly changing global 
economy.
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 Furthermore, workers become disposable as capital continuously seeks 
to cut labor costs though automation and outsourcing.  Neo-liberal management 
books of  the 1990s like the best seller, Who Moved My Cheese? use a childlike 
allegory about mice who embrace change to prepare the ideological terrain for 
the new entrepreneurial worker. The lesson is that it is better to see losing one’s 
job as an opportunity for some better entrepreneurial opportunity that surely lies 
around the corner. The new entrepreneurial culture that is promoted in all sectors 
of  society prepares employees for this new world of  unstable employment in the 
new “risk” society (Beck, 1992).  Along with this new instability of  work comes 
intensification of  work leading to longer work hours and greater levels of  stress 
and anxiety. 
 However, Sennett (1998) argues that such trends are actually counter-
productive for business, since the cost to business of  the resulting short-term 
employment is that it reduces employee loyalty and organizational memory. 
Moreover, with shorter contracts, work in teams, and a highly competitive internal 
work environment, authentic relationships are less likely to form because of  
short timelines.  This continuous employee turnover and the tendency to use 
temporary workers and outside consultants weaken institutional knowledge.  He 
argues that these new tendencies are good for the bottom line and stock prices, 
but are not good for the long-term health of  businesses, national productivity, or 
the building of  relationships and personal character. In fact, he titled one book in 
his recent trilogy, The Corrosion of  Character: The Personal Consequences of  work in the 
New Capitalism. 
 The creation of  authentic human ties cannot easily occur in transient 
workplaces and communities. As principals in schools are moved from school 
to school and teacher turnover, especially in urban districts grows, a similar 
phenomenon occurs in education. Flexible organizations in a choice environment 
means teachers, administrators, and students will be more mobile, leading to 
less stability and a weakening of  organizational learning. New, younger teachers 
may tolerate increased intensification and standardization of  work, but many 
experienced teachers with families and a strong professional culture are tending 
to change careers or retire early. The very notion of  teaching or administration as 
a life-long career is becoming a thing of  the past. In the long run, this will have 
devastating effects on the quality of  schooling.
 Sennett (2006) also identifies other personal deficits associated with this 
new neoliberal culture. The first is the demise of  the work ethic. Only a fool 
would delay gratification in the new flexible workplace. Employees report feeling 
a sense of  personal betrayal as companies trade loyalty to workers for short-term 
profits. While some “bootcamp” charter schools may harness the idealism of  elite 
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twenty-somethings for a time, eventually, they burn out and move on to more 
lucrative careers. Second, this loss of  long-term employment with its associated 
benefits and pensions make it more difficult for newer generations of  employees 
to create life narratives. While much Welfare State employment was not exciting, 
it provided people with a life narrative in which they could pay a mortgage over 
30 years, look forward to a pension and social security, and plan for vacations. 
There is an absence of  any way to think strategically about one’s life, one’s sense 
of  purpose, future goals, and economic security.
 In flattened hierarchies or network organizations, pyramidal hierarchy is 
replaced by a horizontal elite core and a mass periphery with minimal mediation 
and communication between the two. It represents a new concentration of  power 
without centralization of  authority.  According to Sennett (1998), “this absence 
of  authority frees those in control to shift, adapt, reorganize without having to 
justify themselves or their acts. In other words, it permits the freedom of  the 
moment, a focus just on the present. Change is the responsible agent; change is 
not a person” (Sennett, 1998, p. 115). 
 Internal units are created to compete with each other for contracts. 
Outside consultants are brought in to do the dirty work that management used 
to do. Senior management can claim they are taking their cue from the expert 
consultants who come in and leave quickly.  In this impersonal environment, no 
relationships are built, as no one has to take responsibility for decisions. Upper 
management with its stronger networks moves more often as new opportunities 
arise. Personnel records take the place of  humans who are being standardized so 
“performance” can be compared (just as high stakes testing in education allows 
students, teachers, and schools to be compared as a prerequisite for a marketized 
system). Flexibility to adjust to changes in the market is gained. This is perhaps 
good news for stockholders seeking short term profits, upper level executives 
and consultancy firms, but it isn’t clear who else benefits, or what it contributes 
to the common good. It also, according to Sennett, makes long term, authentic 
relationships less likely. 
 This new model is being intentionally implemented in school districts 
across the country. In New York City, under Mayor Bloomberg, a corporate 
model was implemented. Upper-level public administrators contracted out to 
private companies or took private sector positions in the burgeoning education 
services industry. Principals had a “choice” of  vendors and networks. Public-
private partnerships were the vehicle and discourse for this shift in work culture. 
This restructuring of  the institutional environment dramatically changed the 
work culture of  schools. While it is true that some professionals thrive in such 
environments, most principals in New York City reported being more beleaguered 
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than empowered (Shipps, 2012). If  Sennett’s analysis of  the new corporate culture 
is any indication, in education, we can expect to see less employee loyalty, more 
work stress, and a performance culture.
BILL GATES: “IT IS ASTONISHING WHAT GREAT TEACHERS 
CAN DO FOR THEIR STUDENTS”
 Unlike Finland, The U.S. has chosen an approach to education that 
does not emphasize public investment, but rather the market-based, incentivist 
policies and high stakes outcomes measures (Adamson, Astrand & Darling-
Hammond, 2016). This approach aligns with neoliberal’s anti-government and 
anti-union ideology. While investment in education had remained relatively stable 
prior to 2008 (Baker, 2017), since the recession of  2008, policies of  austerity 
and disinvestment in the U.S. have hit public schools and teachers hard. Since 
schools are largely financed in the U.S. at the state and local levels, some states 
and communities have been hit harder than others. With less public investment, 
public schools are becoming increasingly overcrowded and under resourced as 
teachers work harder for less pay and larger class sizes. It also leads to more 
parents abandoning public schools for other options, including a new breed 
of  “prestige charter schools” designed for more privileged parents (Brown & 
Makris, 2017). This, added to an already unequal system based on property taxes, 
is leading to further social stratification and racial segregation. 
 Weare also becoming increasingly aware that these neoliberal policies 
of  disinvestment by the State are heavily influenced by new policy networks 
of  venture philanthropists, thinktanks, foundations, international agencies and 
edubusinesses, which are themselves global (Ball, 2012; Fang, , 2017; Verger, 
Lubienski & Steiner-Khamsi, 2016).As public schools are increasingly absorbed 
into a market, profit, and efficiency logic, theprofessional identities of  teachers 
and leaders are being redesigned around the vision of  these policyentrepreneurs, 
few of  whom are educators or steeped in education policy research (Ball, 2001; 
Gillies, 2011). 
 These think tanks, venture philanthropists, and media outlets flood the 
public with misinformation and “fake” news and documentaries about education. 
Venture philanthropist, Bill Gates (2011) proclaimed in the Washington Post,
Over the past four decades, the per-student cost of  running our K-12 schools 
has more than doubled, while our student achievement has remained virtually flat. 
Meanwhile, other countries have raced ahead (Bill Gates, 2011.)
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 Even though experts on school finance have debunked this claim, they 
typically don’t have access to the opinion page of  the Washington Post (see Baker, 
2017). On the other hand, Gates (2011) promotes teacher development as the 
solution, arguing that,
We know that of  all the variables under a school’s control, the single most decisive 
factor in student achievement is excellent teaching. It is astonishing what great 
teachers can do for their students. (Bill Gates, 2011)
 While educators would not disagree with this, it is ultimately an argument 
for social disinvestment, since it expects teachers to make up for other social 
factors that require social investment.
 During the 1960 and 1970s there was greater social investment in 
children and families and a more equitable distribution of  society’s resources. 
“Equal Educational Opportunity” was the slogan of  the day and the title of  the 
Coleman Report (Coleman, Campbell, Hobson and McPartland,1966), the largest 
federally funded study of  education. During the George W. Bush administration, 
this languageof  equal opportunity was changed in all federal documents, to 
“narrowing the achievement gap”. This was largely a ploy to shift the emphasis 
from education inputs (resources) to education outputs (test results) (Crawford, 
2007). 
 Ironically, Barton & Coley (2010) have documented in “The Black-White 
Achievement Gap: When Progress Stopped”, that “from the early 1970s until 
the late 1980s, a very large narrowing of  the gap occurred in both reading and 
mathematics, with the size of  the reduction depending on the subject and age 
group examined” (Barton & Coley , 2010, p. 7). They go on to assert that “during 
the 1990s, the gap narrowing generally halted, and actually began to increase in 
some cases.” (Barton & Coley , 2010, p. 7). So, while Gates’ call for a focus on 
developing great teachers is a useful discursive device, it is often used by policy-
makers to transfer the failure of  the State onto teachers, and these new policy 
entrepreneurs are brilliant at discursively framing their neoliberal policy goals 
(Lakoff, 2008). 
 Moreover, these new global policy networks are largely bipartisan, 
implemented in England by the Tories and Labour, in the U.S. by both Republicans 
and Democrats, and in Chile by theChristian Democrats and the Concertación 
(an alliance of  left parties). Apple (2001) provides auseful overview of  what 
he calls a “hegemonic alliance of  the New Right” including 1) neoliberals, 2) 
socialconservatives, 3) religious conservatives and a 4) new professional middle 
class. This is also more or less the alliance that elected Donald Trump.
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 Apple’s (2001) notion of  alliances is useful inthat even though these groups 
may differ in some areas ideologically and politically, they form a sortof  informal 
coalition pushing for markets, standardization, a reversal of  separation of  church 
andstate, and a perpetuation of  inequality based on notions of  individualism and 
meritocracy, largely because of  the influence of  these bipartisan policy networks, 
a long list of  reforms hasbeen implemented globally in the last three decades. 
They include high-stakes testing, school choice,vouchers (or tuition tax credits) 
in some cities and states, charter schools (or their equivalent in other countries), 
principal “autonomy,” alternative and fast trackpathways to careers in teaching 
and leading, privatization and contracting out of  public services, mayoralcontrol, 
data-driven management, public-private partnerships, increased school policing 
andsurveillance, schools and districts as profit-centers for “vendors”, and the for-
profit organization of  learning through virtual schools and online instruction.
 In fact, most of  these reforms are not being adopted in middle class and 
affluent communities, but are largely targeting low-income communities of  color 
(Scott, 2011). While school choice polices and the privatization of  urban public 
schools is promoted by many reformers asthe civil rights issue of  our time, some 
research is finding that public schools actually out-perform private and charter 
schools when socio-economic level is controlled for (Lubienski&Lubienski,2014; 
Mizala & Romaguera, 1998).
 In education, these changes have had a dramatic impact on what it means 
to be a teacher and leader, particularly in districts that serve low-income students. 
New advocacy networks fundedby venture philanthropists seek the demise of  
university-based teacher education and the productionof  “new professionals” who 
are trained to work in the highly scripted, franchised charter and virtualschools of  
the future (Mungal, 2016; zeichner & Pena-Sandoval, 2015).
“Warm Body” Laws and the De-professionalization of  Teachers.
Known as the “warm body” law, Arizona Senate Bill 1042 signed into law in May, 
2017 by Republican Governor Doug Ducey, permits “persons” with a college 
degree to bypass Arizona’s regular teacher certification process to obtain grades 
6-12 teaching certificates. They should have 5 years of  relevant experience, but 
“relevant experience” was not defined. In Arizona, charter school “teachers” 
were already exempt from state certification requirements. Since 2009, the 
Arizona Legislature has cut school district capital funding by 85% while it has 
increased charter school funds for capital purchases and facilities by 15%.
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A NEW REGIME OF GOVERNANCE: TRANSFERRING 
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT PRINCIPALS TO THE PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS
 How the governance of  organizations in the public sector has been 
transformed by networks of  “reformers” is the subject of  New Public Management, 
sometimes referred to as new managerialism or neo-Taylorism (Au, 2011; Trujillo, 
2014).  Of  course, public organizations have always been managed, but in the 
last four decades there has been a shift from a rule-governed, administrative, 
bureaucratic management regime to a market and outcomes-based, corporate 
management regime borrowed from the business world1. The following are the 
most common ideas and practices transferred from the corporate sector (Hood, 
1991; Bottery, 1996; Ward, 2011):
 • The introduction of  markets and quasi-markets within and between 
public organizations (e.g. schools)
 • Closing low-performing organizations and creating “start ups” that are 
often outside of  local democratic control (e.g., charter schools)
 • An emphasis on explicit standards and measures of  performance
 • Greater emphasis on outcomes and their measurement using quantitative 
data
 • Greater use of  standardization and “scaling up” of  practices
 • Contracting out public services to vendors in the private sector and the 
increased use of  consulting companies
 • The public sector as an emerging profit center  
 • A trend toward temporary and short-term workers and against 
unionization
 • Administrative decentralization and bounded autonomy
 • Greater discipline and parsimony in resource use in a context of  
austerity and disinvestment
 Most educators have experienced these practices in their daily professional 
lives. More veteran educators may remember a time before these practices were 
dominant. Moreover, not all states or school districts have adopted these policies, 
although NCLB and Race to the Top forced most states to do adopt many of  
them. In reality, a single governance regime is seldom in place in any state or 
1 The previous bureaucratic form of  organizing and managing schools was also borrowed from 
industrial business leaders who propagated organizing efficient schools around the factory model. However, as 
professional organizations, they contained—in theory, at least-- a strong professional and public ethos.
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district. It is more likely that teachers and leaders experience a mix of  different 
regimes. Therefore, we provide a brief  overview of  the previous management 
regime and those that are competing for dominance. 
 The corporate regime described above is seldom implemented in an ideal 
fashion. Michael Bloomberg and his chancellor, Joel Klein, attempted to do so 
during his 12 years as mayor of  New York City and New Orleans attempted 
to do so after Hurricane Katrina. Other cities, such as Chicago, Philadelphia, 
Washington D.C., Denver, and Detroit also implemented a market regime to 
some extent. Most of  these cities have experienced a great deal of  resistance from 
community organizations and teachers unions, including a national parent–led, 
opt out of  testing movement. 
 The review in Table 1, presented in the forwarding pages of  the four 
principal governance regimes that are in competition is borrowed from Shipps’ 
(2012) study of  New York City principals under former mayor Bloomberg’s 
Market regime. However, as Shipps argues, there are variations within the market 
regime, and some may exhibit some aspects more than others. She identifies three 
variations of  the Market Regime.
 The first is the corporate variation, which borrows notions of  statistical 
control of  product quality from the corporate sector. The premise is that 
corporate practices of  standardized evaluation, curriculum, and services, pay-
for-performance and other meritocratic policies will lead to greater efficiency 
and accountability. What makes this approach different from the previous 
bureaucratic, administrative regime (also a product of  corporate influence), is 
that control is exercised at a distance through outcomes measures as opposed 
to an internal supervisory model. Control is also exercised through what some 
call concertive control by shifting “the locus of  control from management to 
the workers themselves, who collaborate to develop the means of  their own 
control” (Barker, 1993, p. 411), typically within narrowly defined limits. The use 
of  outcomes measures also provides indicators consumers can use to choose 
schools, which brings us to the entrepreneurial variation of  the Market Regime.
 Entrepreneurialism, which emphasizes competition and client choice, 
creates conditions in which everyone is either a consumer or a marketer. Schools 
become autonomous businesses competing for (and selecting or rejecting) clients, 
which principals competing with each other for students and teachers. The public-
school system is viewed as a “monopoly” and the system is privatized as private 
vendors (many for-profit) compete for public money. Markets are also employed 
as accountability systems under the assumption that, like businesses, those that 
fail to attract sufficient clients should be closed. 
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 Most school districts, including the New York City, have developed a 
combination of  corporate and entrepreneurial strategies called Diverse Provider 
Regimes, or sometimes referred to as portfolio districts. As Shipps (2012) notes, this 
regime “combines the standardized outcomes and internal competition of  the 
Corporate Market Regime with an increasedsupply of  schools and client choice 
adopted from Entrepreneurial Market Regimes” (Shipps, 2012, p. 7). In this way, 
districts hope to get the benefits of  both regimes, but principals often get mixed 
and sometimes contradictory accountability messages.
 As we can see from Table 1, while the Market Regime is dominant in most 
states and districts that have such policies as high stakes accountability, school 
choice, andpay-for performance, in some cases other regimes may be dominant 
or emergent. For instance, in many rural school districts an Administrative Regime 
may still be dominant, in part because, unlike urban settings in which there are 
many schooling choices, rural districts often only have a handful of  schools. This 
is also true in many affluent suburbs, where home owners have chosen to buy a 
home there, in part because of  the public schools.
 In an Administrative Regime accountability is still largely internal, 
through supervision, bureaucratic mandates, established norms, credentialing, 
and a certain level of  social trust and public service. The Administrative Regime, 
which was dominant in the post WW II years, generally had elements of  the 
Professional Regime as well, in the sense that teachers had more professional 
discretion as leaders buffered them from parents and some bureaucratic mandates. 
Elements of  the Professional regime is also present in the form choosing their 
own professional development, being involved in hiring, and professional learning 
communities or leadership teams, although, as noted above, these can be coopted 
by the Market Regime.  
 Finally, the Empowerment Regime is one that is responsive to particular 
interest groups or organized communities. These might be parent or 
neighborhood organizations seeking community control or social movement 
unions, such as the Chicago Teachers’ Union. There are many interest groups 
today that are an extension of  or funded by those promoting a Market Regime, 
so an Empowerment Regime means being able to distinguish between grassroots 
organizations and largely corporate funded and typically anti-union advocacy 
groups, often referred to as “astroturf ” or “grasstops” organizations. This can 
also be a problem with community organizations and unions as well, as it is not 
always clear who represents the community or, in the case of  unions, the rank and 
file membership.  
 Sometimes, responsiveness may be to low-income parents in gentrifying 
communities, or finding ways to engage them in authentic forms of  participation 
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in school decision-making. Sometimes it involves taking as asset rather than 
deficit view of  parents and communities and seeing them as experts on their own 
children (Gonzalez, Moll &Amanti, 2005; Green, 2015). In the micro-political 
matrix in chapter five, we described how the empowering leader differs from 
authoritarian, facilitative, and adversarial leaders. 
Table 1: Four Ideal Types of  Governing and Their Theoretical 
Characteristics
Regime Agenda Preferred Accountability
Essential 
Actors
Essential 
resources 
Essential 
relationships
Administrative 
Regime
Sustain system 
by buffering it 
from political 
interference 
Bureaucratic 
mandates
Teachers, 
Administrators, 
school board
Technical routines, 
Established norms, 
Legitimate training 
and credentials, 
Educator cohesion, 
Solidarity 
among 
educators and 
skepticism 
about external 
change agents.
Professional 
Regime
Change the 
pedagogy and the 
culture of schools
Professional 
Discretion
Teachers, 
Parents, 
Administrators, 
Elected officials
Educator 
expertise, Parental 
commitment, Inter-
group mediation, 
Pedagogical 
alternatives, 
Increased 
government 
funding.
Trust between 
parents and 
educators 
across class, 
race, and 
ethnic lines. 
Empowerment 
Regime
Authorize new 
decision makers 
to enable better 
unprecedented 
decisions.
Political 
responsiveness
New Decision-
makers, 
Education 
interest groups, 
Elected and 
appointed 
officials. 
New governing 
institutions. 
Cohesive group 
representation. 
Uncorrupted 
leadership, Inter-
group mediation, 
Legitimate 
governing 
alternatives, benefit 
redistribution
Pacts by 
interest 
groups to 
share decision 
arenas and 
decision-
making.
Market 
Regimes
Restructure 
schooling for 
efficiency and 
accountability 
(corporate) or 
Restructure 
schooling for 
competition 
and choice 
(entrepreneurial)
Performance 
of Market 
Iniciatives
System 
managers, 
Business, elites 
(corporate) 
or System 
managers, 
Private providers, 
Parents 
(entrepreneurial)
Engaged market 
sector, Revised 
regulations, Public 
investment in 
markets, Consumer 
Information, 
Legitimate 
market actors, 
Performance 
Incentives 
(corporate) or 
Private financing 
for startups 
(entrepreneurial)
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 But these practices have become dominant, not because they are more 
effective or have been successful at improving our public-school system. From an 
institutional perspective (Meyer & Rowan, 2006), one might argue that educators 
have adopted these principals because they enhance the status of  educators. 
It is better to be called a CEO than a district superintendent. But this doesn’t 
explain how the status of  the public sector has become so degraded. Advocates 
of  privatization refer deprecatingly to public schools as “government schools” as 
if  the government isn’t—in theory, at least--the expression of  our public will. 
 The viability and popularity of  New Public Management and privatization 
has been prepared discursively. Drawing on Whitfield’s (2001) study of  the 
privatization process in Britain, Ball (2007) describes three stages through which 
the creative destruction of  the public sector is accomplished. While this is not a 
coordinated, linear process, it has the following internal logic. The public sector is 
destabilized through discourses of  derision and constant ridicule to undermine its 
credibility. This is accompanied by disinvestment from and shifting resources within 
the public sector. Finally, a process of  commodification “reworks forms of  service, 
social relations and public processes into forms that are measurable and thus 
contractible or marketable (Ball, 2007, p. 24). In this way new markets are created 
that attract private providers creating whole new arenas of  commercial activity 
for “social entrepreneurs.”
 It is within the context of  broader material and discursive change that 
the educational institutional terrain is prepared for NPM “reforms.” As public 
institutions like schools and universities become more financially strapped, they 
need to seek funding from the private sector, in many cases from new philanthropic 
organizations with privatizing agendas. These patterns are evident in an example 
Ball (2007) offers from a school principal, “You can’t run on your ordinary 
budget, everyone knows that, so you have to get involved in various initiatives 
and cater for that, the initiative’s priorities, and bend your curriculum and your 
priorities in order to get hold of  that bit of  money” (Ball, 2007, p. 23). This 
principal articulates organizational barriers that are deeply informed by broader 
NPM discursive shifts. Reformist solutions, such as public-private partnerships 
that help to breach and re-work key boundaries between the public and private 
(Robertson, Verger, Mundy & Menashy, 2014; Verger & Moschetti, 2016), emerge 
as preferable only within these broader discursive and institutional contexts of  
public disinvestment. These shifting discourses create new material demands 
upon schools, which have increasingly become stabilized as a new normal that 
organizational leaders must adapt to. In the following section, we describe how 
these shifts in the governance of  educational organizations have changed the role 
and identities of  teachers and administrators. 
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THE EMERGENCE OF NEW PROFESSIONALISM
 Evetts (2011) conceptualizes the shift in professionalism as one 
from emphasizing “notions of  partnership, collegiality, discretion and trust to 
increasing levels of  managerialism, bureaucracy, standardization, assessment and 
performance review” (Evetts, 2011, p. 407). Scholars of  new professionalism argue 
that while there are some continuities from the “old” professionalism, a shift has 
occurred as professionals are increasingly managed and controlled, a tendency that 
Evetts (2011) refers to as organizational professionalismor professionalism “from 
above” (Evetts, 2011, p. 407). She contrasts this with occupational professionalism 
or professionalism “from within” and documents a shift from professional to 
managerialist values. 
 This shift suggests a decrease in professional autonomy and in control 
over one’s profession through the exercise of  professional judgment and 
through professional associations, and an increase in control by managers in 
work organizations. This control is characterized by rational-legal control, 
standardized work procedures and practices, and external forms of  regulation 
and accountability measures, or what some have called governing or steering from 
a distance (Kickert, 1995: Rose, 1993).
 Although a discourse of  “autonomy” and “empowerment” is sometimes 
used to promote current education reforms, such autonomy is exceedingly 
constrained and often part of  a strategy of  tightening up “loosely coupled 
systems” (Honig & Rainey, 2012; Meyer & Rowan, 2006). In other words, as we 
will discuss in more detail below, while in older public bureaucracies, teachers 
could create autonomy (for good or ill) by shutting the classroom door, “post-
bureaucratic” organizations of  today are more tightly coupled as high stakes 
testing can breach the door and enter the classroom. 
 These NPM reforms instill greater autonomy and an entrepreneurial 
ethos in budgeting, contracting, and hiring, while the core elements of  instruction 
and curriculum are steered from the top through standards and testing. Managerial 
moves to provide greater autonomy for middle managers are often part of  a trend 
toward work intensification. For instance, in New York City, where autonomy and 
markets were central to Mayor Bloomberg’s reforms, school principals reported 
being more beleaguered than empowered (Shipps, 2012).
 This shift from occupational to organizational professionalism may seem 
more dramatic for some professions, such as physicians, who are increasingly 
leaving private practice for large hospitals and health organizations. Teachers, on 
the other hand, have always worked largely within public or private bureaucracies, 
but the loosely coupled nature of  educational systems buffered teachers from more 
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direct forms of  control, depending chiefly on internal forms of  accountability 
(DiPaola &Tschannen-Moran, 2005; Weick, 1976). This meant that while the 
bureaucracy and principals exerted a certain level of  hierarchical control, teachers 
exercised a great deal of  autonomy in their classrooms. They were only under 
direct control when they were being observed by principals or supervisors. 
 Welch (1998) documents parallels between today’s reforms and business-
led reforms of  the nineteenth and early twentieth century when forms of  efficiency 
were imposed on schooling through the imposition of  a business ethos. In his 
analysis of  the British Revised Code of  1860 whose centerpiece was “payment by 
results,” he documents the audit culture of  the time, which, like today, resulted in 
creative compliance. According to Welch, 
teachers ‘stuffed and almost roasted’ their pupils on test items once the teachers 
knew that the visit of  the inspector was imminent. Other teachers secretly trained 
their pupils so that when they were asked questions they raised their right hands 
if  they knew the correct answer but their left if  they did not, thus creating a more 
favorable impression upon the visiting inspector. (Welch, 1998, p. 161)
 Nearly one hundred and fifty years later, such pressures are having a 
similar effect. The following is from the Columbus dispatch in Columbus, Ohio, 
but newspapers across the country are full of  similar stories.
Answer sheets and test booklets arrive at districts in securely taped boxes, shipped 
by FedEx or UPS. Packets are shrink-wrapped and are supposed to be stored in a 
locked room until test time. But in some districts, teachers got access last school 
year. Some made copies. Others shared the questions with students ahead of  time, 
or gave answers during the test. And a few devised nonverbal signals to cue children 
that their answers were incomplete. For all the lock-and-key procedures and explicit 
rules, more teachers cheated on Ohio standardized tests than ever before (Smith 
Richards, 2006, p.4).
 The difference between these two examples is that in the second one 
teachers are controlled from a distance and by a faceless inspector, that comes 
shrink wrapped and delivered by UPS, or today more likely through a computer 
screen. These forms of  control not only bypass the principal and superintendent 
and flow directly into the classroom, but they also decrease the amount of  
autonomy teachers and principals have over curriculum and instruction. 
 Some have argued that principals appear to have benefited by receiving 
greater autonomy over such things as budgets and hiring, and appear to be re-
professionalizing (Jarl, Fredrikson & Persson, 2011). But they are encouraged 
to professionalize around the principles of  New Public Management and to 
do so independent of  teachers, which reinforces a management-worker split. 
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Furthermore, alternative pathways to the principalship--and teaching as well-
-have weakened attempts at professionalization through the usual channels of  
certification and professional associations.
NEW ENTREPRENEURIAL PROFESSIONALS WITHIN AN 
AUDIT CULTURE
 From policing to teaching to practicing medicine, the shift to New 
Public Management elaborated above has reconstituted most occupations and 
professions. In education, a new generation of  teachers and administrators are 
being socialized into a very different workplace with a different conception of  
teaching and leading. While teachers increasingly teach to the test, leaders are 
expected to lead to the test. Since control is now exercised through market 
discipline and high stakes tests that increasingly drive what goes on in classrooms, 
principals are being given more and more “autonomy,” oftentimes to exercise 
leadership over less and less (Shipps, 2012). 
 Some see promise in the notion of  distributed leadership as a way to 
build greater professional capacity. But, while workplaces are being redesigned 
to intensify work and distribute it horizontally, power is being distributed upward 
by centralizing policy over curriculum and instruction through high stakes 
testing and mayoral control. According to Evetts (2011), these developments are 
shifting the locus of  control from a previous focus on professional judgment 
to control through policies that increase organizational professionalism from 
above and reduce occupational professionalism from within. The new teacher 
and administrator are put in a position in which they must look to market and 
test-based forms of  accountability for direction rather than their professional 
instincts, training, associations, or unions. The ability of  new digital technologies 
to integrate management information systems and standardize the labor process 
promises to intensify this tendency (Burch, 2014; Selwyn, 2011). 
 Another way of  thinking of  this that we have moved from an emphasis 
on internal accountability to external accountability. According to Carnoy, Elmore, 
and Siskin (2003), internal forms of  accountability include, 
Individual teachers’ and administrators’ beliefs about teaching and learning, their 
shared understanding of  who their students are, the routines they develop for 
getting their work done, and the external expectations from parents, communities, 
and administrative agencies under which they work. (Carnoy, Elmore, and Siskin. 
2003, p. 3)
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 Ironically, this shift in accountability has both narrowed their professional 
discretion while also expanding and intensifying their role expectations. 
Summarizing research in changing teacher roles in the U.S., Valli & Buese (2007) 
discuss a widening scope of  teacher responsibilities, including heightened 
expectations of  collaboration outside the classroom, strict adherence to new 
curricular and instructional requirements, and the collection and analysis of  
assessment data.
 While these additional role expectations could--and under certain 
circumstances--have expanded educators’ professionalism (Stillman, 2011), it has 
more often tended to reduce it to working within an audit culture of  external 
metrics that requires being accountable to standards and criteria that they had 
no part in developing (Apple, 2004; Strathern, 2000). As noted at the beginning 
of  this chapter, even where professional learning communities are in place, the 
data teachers are encouraged to analyze and the tasks they rehearse are typically 
not their own. In most cases, conception and execution have been successfully 
separated (Apple & Jungck, 1992). This separation mimics proletarianization, in 
which craft labor was fragmented and replaced by factory wage labor.
 The shift to greater external accountability has not only exposed 
educators to new forms of  control through an audit culture and curbs on their 
professional judgment, but also to a marketized environment that forces them to 
compete both internally with each other and externally with other organizations. 
So, professionals, adept at co-existing with bureaucratic forms of  control, 
find themselves in new territory. Freidson (2001) viewed professionalism as a 
mechanism for organizing some aspects of  social life based on expertise and social 
trust. Professionals depend on this social trust with the public for their legitimacy. 
In this sense, professionalism both competed with and provided some protection 
from both market and bureaucratic forms of  organization. As professionalism is 
eroded as a countervailing force to both bureaucracy and markets, social trust and 
public capacity-building is eroded as well. 
 The new pressure to compete has created the new entrepreneurial 
professional, requiring teachers and principals to become more competitive. For 
instance, the role expectations of  today’s principals and superintendents have 
become more entrepreneurial as they are increasingly asked to interface, not 
only with a district or state bureaucracy, but rather with a series of  vendors and 
consultants selling them everything from professional development services to 
data warehousing and management (Burch, 2009).
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WHAT’S WRONG WITH PRINCIPALS BEING 
ENTREPRENEURIAL LEADERS?
 Throughout this article, I have been critical of  this shift towards more 
entrepreneurial and competitive forms of  leadership. Yet older, public servant 
approaches to leadership have also been heavily critiqued as failing to challenge 
the grammar of  schooling and the inequalities public schools have reproduced 
(Callahan, 1962; Foster, 1986). The premise of  public school leadership has 
generally been to serve and be an advocate for all children, though this has seldom 
been realized. Soone might rightfully ask how a market-based approach might 
better serve all children and lead to greater achievement and equitable outcomes. 
 Before the age of  NPM, teachers who aspired to be principals were 
taught that their central task as an instructional leader was to help a teaching 
staff  improve their instruction, even with a staff  composed of  teachers ranging 
from incompetent to outstanding. If  the incompetent ones (usually only one or 
two) could not improve after working with them over time, then the task was to 
counsel them out of  teaching or use documentation to move them out (Bridges, 
1992). They were not taught to harass them or scapegoat unions; but rather were 
taught how to provide due process by helping struggling teachers improve, while 
documenting their work in case they did not.
 They were also taught how to encourage professional renewal for burned 
out or “plateaued” teachers, how to target professional development for the 
teachers with specific needs, and how to inspire the good teachers to become 
outstanding (Milstein, 1990). The dilemma for most principals back then was 
how to carry out both a management and instructional leadership role given the 
time constraints (Rallis & Highsmith, 1986). Gradually, teacher leader positions, 
literacy coaches, and professional learning communities (PLCs) were added in 
many schools for additional support for teacher development and instructional 
support.  
 Because most teachers saw teaching as a career and stayed in schools 
longer, there was time to do this kind of  capacity building in the school, which 
also meant transferring this building capacity system-wide if  these teachers 
moved to another school. All children benefited when teachers improved. This 
was seen as particularly important in low-income schools where students needed 
skilled teachers and depended on institutional agents, like teachers, counselors 
and administrators for access to dominant social and cultural capital (Stanton-
Salazar, 2011). 
 The new entrepreneurial principal, modeled after business CEOs, works 
in a different social context and brings a different ethos and internal logic to 
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the public sector (Ward, 2011). Particularly in urban school districts with school 
choice policies, there is a tendency for principals to recruit “lower-maintenance” 
students and teachers to their schools in order to improve test scores. “High 
maintenance” students, such as those with learning disabilities, limited English or 
behavior problems require more effort, resources and skilled teachers. 
 Given the amount of  time and effort some principals have to put into 
marketing their schools in these districts, there is often little time to mentor 
teachers, they know students with special needs or behavior problems may lower 
their test scores. 
 Charter schools are particularly geared for this kind of  entrepreneurialism, 
but even public school principals in districts with school choice are pressured 
to engage in the same behavior (Lubienski & Lubienski, 2006). Charter schools 
tend to have far fewer students with special education or English Language needs 
(Baker, 2012), leaving public schools to work with more of  these students. Some 
principals have figured out that if  they recruit good teachers, their job is easier, 
their test scores improve and their careers take off. In reality, most principals 
would rather not play this cynical game, but if  competition is the game, then they 
have to play. 
 Shipps and White (2009) interviewed principals in New York City. A 
typical response to the pressures of  the accountability was the following:
We aggressively go after teachers…We spend a ton of  money andeffort on 
teacher recruitment, everything from having fancy materials that make our school 
lookbetter than any other school, and banners…My hiring coordinator, you know, 
emails every[education] professor…at every major university around the country. 
(Shipps and White, 2009, p. 368)
 They found that principals also had strategies for recruiting students to 
make sure they got the “right kids”. Here is one principal’s strategy:
I’m a competitive person by nature…soI think by nature you are always looking at 
where you stand in comparison to those in your community…I study the ones who 
don’t come…[Ours] isn’t always their first choice. There are two other choices they 
[tend to] make…So generally we go through all the applications…I get a thousand 
applicantsfor seventy-five seats. I’m never in a situation where I go begging for 
kids, I just need the right kids. (Shipps and White, 2009, p. 368)
 Competition is also common within schools. Students are often awarded 
with T-shirts or vouchers to buy snacks. Teachers compete with each other for the 
best test scores, which means they mimic principals in trying not to have “more 
difficult” students assigned to their classes. 
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 What is troubling about these quotes is not merely that competition is 
changing what professionals do, but rather who they are. It is reconstructing their 
very identities, both personal and professional. 
 But a principal who recruits great teachers to his or her school is not 
building capacity. Those teachers leave behind a classroom of  equally deserving 
students at their former school. All this does is move resources around the 
district or between districts with the goal of  enhancing a particular school’s (and 
by extension, principal’s) performance. Closing, turning around or reconstituting 
schools does the same thing. It just moves resources around the system on the 
pretext of  getting rid of  “bad teachers” (Malen, Croninger, Muncey & Redmond-
Jones, 2002).  The former notion of  principals as instructional leaders, helping all 
teachers improve, increases system capacity. The entrepreneurial model does not. 
 At least an entrepreneurial business person can argue that her self-
interest in building a successful business allows her to support herself  and her 
family and creates jobs for others. She wants to poach good employees from 
other companies because they are in competition for customers. This is the nature 
of  a business. 
 But in public school systems, viewing a school as “my business” or “start 
up” produces pressures to recruit good teachers from other schools, to reject kids 
who might lower my test scores, and to market my school to far flung parents. 
The nature of  a public school is to work for the common good of  all families 
and children, not just those in “my school.” It is hard to imagine how this can be 
viewed as serving or being an advocate for all children, and there is no evidence 
that it pays off  in higher achievement levels. In fact, there is evidence that it adds 
to an already highly stratified and segregated public school system (Frankenberg, 
Siegel-Hawley & Wang, 2011).
 There is also evidence that a focus on using test scores as a metric for 
competition has caused school leaders to focus less on non-cognitive skills, 
eliminating the affective, physical, political and socio-emotional dimension of  
schooling. Reardon (may, 2013) in discussing a growing social class achievement 
gap in testing and college attendance, indicates that 
A related trend during the last 20 years is the growing social-class gap in other 
important measures of  adolescents’ “soft skills” and behaviors related to civic 
engagement, such as participating in extracurricular activities, sports, and academic 
clubs; volunteering and participating in community life; and self-reports of  social 
trust (Putnam, Frederick, & Snellman, 2012).
 Of  course, it is also true that public schools for poor families and children 
of  color were not very good thirty years ago before a market logic entered 
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education. But had districts continued to focus on an ethos of  public service 
professional learning communities, and ultimately more cultural responsive 
pedagogies, they might have made more progress by now than by using high stakes 
tests and market logics to “incentivize” and punish teachers and principals. We 
will never know how much progress we might have made. But we do know that 
we have lost many outstanding teachers and principals (and perhaps more than a 
few mediocre ones) because they no longer felt they could use their professional 
judgment to advocate for what they know is best for children. Entrepreneurialism 
can be a wonderful asset for someone starting a business, but it has too often been 
problematic in too many ways for our public education system.
WORKING TOWARD DEMOCRATIC PROFESSIONALISM
 Teaching and school administration as professions have been under attack 
for a long time and some of  the criticisms have merit (Friedrich, 2014; Levine, 
2006). Traditional bureaucracies and the older model of  professionalism were 
notorious for resisting change and failing to meet the needs of  many children in 
urban districts (Meier, 1995; Payne, 2008; Rogers, 2006).  Furthermore, claims to 
professionalism by school personnel have often marginalized the voices of  low-
income parents and communities (Driscoll, 1998; Green, 2015). The task ahead is 
not to merely reassert “traditional” professionalism wholesale, but rather to better 
understand how to resist the most egregious assaults on professionals, while 
acknowledging the weaknesses of  traditional models of  professional training and 
professional accountability2. Such resistance would insist on a professional ethos 
with democratic participation and the public good at its center.  
 Luckily there are alternative pathways to professionalism that do not 
involve de-professionalization and the elimination of  academic training and 
certification, but rather involve building greaterprofessional and social trust 
and greater inclusion of  those we serve, whether they are patients, students, 
soldiers or inmates. Democratic professionals do not yearn for a reassertion of  
what many view as their lost sense of  status and authority. Instead, they seek 
to democratize their practices and their organizations. Movements in bioethics, 
public journalism, and restorative justice are examples of  professionals seeking to 
regain public trust. Dzur (2008) believes that
2  By “traditional” we mean relatively recent university-based professional preparation as opposed to 
previous apprenticeship models.
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Far from a deprofessionalization or anti-institution movement, these reformers 
still value the specific, specialized knowledge of  the seasoned journalist and editor, 
well-studied and practiced physician, and well-trained and experienced judge and 
attorney. As they try to be more democratic and help laypeople gain useful civic 
skills, they also seek to transform ossified conceptions of  professionalism, but they 
are in no way anti-professional. (Dzur, 2008, p.3)
 It is interesting that most reforms that attempt to improve education 
have been imported from business, but there are other sectors that may be more 
appropriate for seeking ideas. For instance, the concept of  restorative justice has 
been imported into education from criminal justice. 
CONCLUSION
 Fenwick (2016) makes a distinction between professional responsibility 
and accountability. Professional responsibility refers to “the expectation for 
professionals to respond to social needs in particular ways. Accountability is about 
how professionals are expected to justify or account for the ways they perform 
those responsibilities” (Fenwick , 2016, p. 9). While professional responsibility 
is centered on the professional’s own judgement and ethics, professional 
accountability is centered on professionals’ compliance with externally imposed 
indicators of  performance. As we can see, the accountability systems we have in 
place often pressure the “new” professional to behave irresponsibly. 
 The example that opened this article illustrates how teachers who opted for 
a more humanizing approach toward the ninth graders that they wanted to retain, 
were encouraged to use spreadsheets of  test scores instead. While this may seem 
like an extreme case, it resonates with most teachers who see their responsibility 
as serving the whole child. Our second example of  the entrepreneurial principal 
illustrates the extent to which market-based, incentivist policies drive principals 
to ignore social needs in favor of  their school, their students, and their careers. 
Like the police officer who needs to arrest one more kid to make his constant 
numbers, professionals are increasingly being pushed into socially irresponsible 
behavior by narrow systems of  accountability.  Solbrekke & Sugrue (2014) argue 
that the notion of  professional responsibility leads to more proactive activity, 
while professional accountability results in more reactive behavior. 
 This raises the question of  professional resistance to accountability 
measures that pressure professionals to behave “irresponsibly.” How might 
professionals “responsibly” resist “irresponsible” accountability schemes? And 
how much risk are professionals willing to tolerate as they feel ethically compelled 
to resist irresponsible policies. Effective resistance would have to consider how 
RBPAE - v. 33, n. 3, p. 561 - 592, set./dez. 2017 585
education professionals make sense of, and negotiate, a complex ecosystem of  
federal and state policy, district mandates, venture philanthropy, policy networks, 
local advocacy groups, and market competition (Koyama, 2014). It would have to 
be clear about not only what and whom is being resisted, but also toward what 
end. It is also more effective and less risky to resist collectively than individually. 
There are many examples of  professionals who are individually and collectively 
engaging proactively in what Achinstein, & Ogawa (2006) call “principled 
resistance” to market-driven and prescriptive education policies. One of  our 
future tasks as researchers is to collaborate with school teachers and leaders to 
document the many individual and collective ways they are resisting.
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